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) Supxeme Court Docket No. 36825-2009 
) Latah County District Court No. 2008-180 
NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY 
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
i 
1 
FOR THE NORTH LATAM COUNTY 1 
I-IIGHWAY DISTRICT; ORLAND 1 
ARNEBERG, RICHARD HANSEN, 1 
SHERMAN CLYDE, in their official 1 
capacities and in their individual capacities; 1 
DAN PAYNF, in his official 1 




Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District for Latah County. 
Honorable Carl Kerrick, District Judge. 
Don and Charlotte Halvorson, pro se 
1290 American Ridge Road, Kendrick. Idaho, 83537, for PlaintiffsIAppellant 
Ronald Landeck, attorney 
Moscow, Idaho, for RespondentsIDefet~dants 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs filed notice of appeal on 611912009 of the District Court's 511 112009 granting of 
cross suinmary judgment in favor of Defendants on all elements of Plaintiffs' complaint. 
Plaintiffs appeal the District Court's final judgment of granting suinmary judgment and attorney 
fees and costs of $78,678.50 to the Defendants and of de~lying partial summary judgment to 
Plaintiffs under 42 USC 5 1983 (I~ereafter § 1983) for the liability of Defendants for the 
deprivation of Plaintiffs' property rights and violations of Plaintiffs' due process (procedural and 
substantive) and equal protection of the law rights. At cross summary judglnent Defendants 
asserted that they had conducted all their activities on Camps Canyon Road (hereafter CCR), a 
public highway, established by user, within a minimum 50 foot width mandated by Idaho law (R, 
Vol. VII, p. 1429, par. 1). Plaintiffs disputed all of Defendants jurisdictio~lal "facts" as the 
agency record evidenced no governmental action to have legally established Defendants' claims; 
and asserted Defendants Ilad no immunity for their constitutional and statutory violations. 
The undisputed material facts of this case include the following. Plaintiffs obtained deed 
to all the lands in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM, with the exception of the 3+1- acre 
parcel', recorded under instrument No. 42441 1 (R., Vol. IV, p. 670-71), Latah County, Idaho in 
December of 1996. Plaintiffs' deed cites a county and public road with the road forming the NE 
' The 3+/- acre parcel was purchased by Eli Harris, predecessor in the land to the Wagners froin 
Per and Anna Johanson, predecessors in the land to the Plaintiffs in 191 1 for all intents and 
purposes for a driveway access to CCR (R, Vol. VI, p. 1152). The historic Harris driveway 
followed the south property line of the 3+/- acre parcel then turned north along the east property 
line to access CCR. Although CCR crossed the Harris farm the crossing was beyond the breaks 
of the canyon. The 3+/- acre parcel accorded Harris a ridge top access to CCR. No one lived on 
the Harris farm after the 1960's. 
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boundary between the. 3+/- acre parcel and Plaintiffs' land (R, Vol. IV, p. 671 (deed description); 
R., Vol. VI, pp. 1155-1 156 (survey and an~ended survey)). No survey was recorded with the 
purchase of the 3+1- acre parcel in 191 1 (R., Vol. V, p. 1152 (Latah County Instrument No. 
57421)). CCR in the SENE Section 15 has never been laid out and recorded by orders of the 
commissioners of the NLCI-ID (R. Vol. V, pp. 883-84, (Chairman Arneberg's response to 
Request for Admission No. 2-Chairman Arneberg does not know if CCR has ever been laid out 
and recorded)). CCR remained stable from its earliest beginnings until the fall of 1996 (R, Vol. 
V, pp.797-798, Interrogatory No. 6 (no changes were noted until beginning in 1996)). In 1996 
alterations were made to the location and width of CCR (R., Vol. V, pp. 867-68, Defendant 
Ameherg's Response to Plaintiffs' Intetl-ogatories 16 (Defendant Arneberg responds to what he 
told Mr. Wagner of the 1996 alterations); R., Vol. V., p. 786, Defendant Arneberg's response to 
Request for Ad~nission No. 3, subpart c. (Defendant Arneberg admits that the physical location 
of CCR was altered in 1996); R., Vol. V, pp. 803-04 Request for Admission Nos. 42, and 43 
(Defendant Payne admits that the centerline and width of CCR were altered in 1996); R., Vol. 
VII, pp. 1401-02, (Ed Swanson speaks of the 1996 alteration to CCR and affirms he gave 
permission for the alteration in the "surface of the roadway")). After the 1996 alteration CCR 
remained stable until the fall of 2005 when the activities of this dispute began. CCR has had no 
official dedication to the public (R, Vol. IV, p. 642, L. 10-12, par. ?(No deed had been recorded 
for CCR); Tr., Vol. I, p. 126, L. 17 through p. 127, L. 6 (there is no such recorded instrument)). 
In the latter part of 2005 neighbors to Plaintiffs' property, the Wagners, sought to re- 
establish the old 31.1- acre parcel driveway and Mr. Wagner called Plaintiffs to confirm his 
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proposed driveway and access to CCR. Plaintiffs met with and explained to the Wagners that the 
llistoric driveway followed the east property line marked by the farm line which was 40 feet to 
the west their proposed access; even though there was an 8' embankment where the east property 
line intersected CCR. Plaintiffs told the Wagners that the NLCHD had altered the road in 1996 
(R., Vol. VI, pp. 135 1-52, par. 9). 
A short time later, in the late fall of 2005, the NLCHD began again to alter the "surface 
of the roadway2" and without notice (R, Vol. V, p. 858, L. 1-4, Interrogatory No. 26) the 
NLCHD pushed 6 inches of gravel into Plaintiffs' buffer3 (R, Vol. 11, p. 407, L. 1-5, par. 2). On 
or about 4/8/06 Plaintiffs discovered that the Wagners had constructed their driveway across the 
east property line to an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land. On 4/10/06 Plaintiff, Don Halvorson, 
called Defendant Dan Payne, NLCHD foreman, and informed him that the driveway access was 
wholly on Plaintiffs' land and asked Mr. Payne if he had issued a permit (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1352, 
pars. 10 and 11) (R, Vol. VII, p. 1429, L. 13-23, par. 3). Mr. Payne said that he had. 
2 ~ o  help eliminate obfuscation, Plaintiffs will use the District Court's definitions. The 
definitions of "right of way", "surface of the roadway", and "statutory authority" are as the 
District Court defines them. R, Vol. VII, p. 1462, L. 15-19) ("Thus, statutory authority 
establishes that fifty feet is the minimum width of a public highway in Idaho. This lnini~iium 
width encompasses the surface area of the roadway, as well as the area that is comlnonly referred 
to as the right of way. The right of way is that area of undeveloped land next to the highway 
which is necessary for the proper upkeep and repair of the road"). Thus, "Surface of the 
roadway" + "right of way"="Statutory authority". 
Plaintiffs' buffer was the undeveloped area between the edge of the "surface of the roadway" 
and Plaintiffs' fence left when Plaintiffs rebuilt the fence to the NE of CCR in 1997 after the 
1996 alteration to CCR to avoid interference with snow storage in the winter with Plaintiffs' 
fence. 
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Procedurally, Plaintiffs began to try to resolve the problems. On 4/12/06 Don IHalvorson 
attended the regular meeting of the NLCHD Commissioners and found that the Wagners were 
also in attendance (R., Vol. V, pp. 864-866 Defendant Arneberg's Response to Interrogatories 
No. 12 (Defendant Arneberg explains the circumstances of the 4112106 NLCHD meeting)). 
Plaintiff Don Halvorson told the Commissioners that the first Wagner driveway access permit 
was issued for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land and that the NLCHD had no "right of way" or 
authority to widen the road or issue the permit (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1352-1355, par. 13). The 
Commissioners said there was a public road so therefore they had prescriptive rights to a 50- 
foot-25-feet fi-om centerline right of way and that right of way justified Defendants' issuance of 
the permit (R, Vol. V, p. 854, L. 13-22, Interrogatory No. 18). Plaintiffs rebutted the 
Commissioners' claims stating that there was no deed of record for a "right of way" for CCR in 
the Latah County records and that their easement was limited to the width ofthe road. Plaintiff 
asked the Commissioners to call for a survey, ie. to join the Wagners in a survey to resolve the 
situation (R, Vol. V, p.842, L. 14-16). Con~missioners refused to call for a survey or to have the 
Wagners obtain a professional survey. Plaintiff stated he would call for a survey (R, Vol. VI, pp. 
1348-1358). In early June 2006 Rimrock Consultants set the stakes for their survey, revealing 
the first Wagner driveway access to be wholly on Plaintiffs land. The Wagners sought a second 
permit and constructed a second driveway west of the east property line. 
However, Plaintiffs' problems with the NLCIHD did not go away; they escalated. 
Beginning in the summer of 2006, Defendants without notice (R, Vol. V, p. 858, Interrogatory 
No. 27) started to add large amounts of dirt and gravel to the "surface of the roadway" and since 
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the winter of 2007 the Defendants have piled snow on Plaintiffs' fence and continued to impact 
Plaintiffs' buffer and fence with additions of rock and gravel throughout 2008 and 2009 resulting 
in significant injuries and repairs to Plaintiffs' fence (Tr. Vol. I, p. 46, L. 13-17; p. 47, L. 10-23). 
The width of, the slope of, or the "surface of the roadway" of CCR is not 50 feet (R., Vol. IV, p. 
638, par. 7 (after the 2006 additions of width the average width is 21 feet); nor do either the 
Defendants or the District Court claim the "surface of the roadway" to be 50 feet (R., Vol. VII, p. 
1460-63, par.2). Defendants added at least 6 to 8 feet of width in 200512006 (R., Vol. IV, p. 638, 
par. 6; R., Vol. VI, p. 1210, par. 4 and 5) encroaching on Plaintiffs' buffer-the area Plaintiffs 
left in 1997 between the road's edge and their fence-and damaging Plaintiffs' fence. 
Beginning in the winter of 2006 and throughout 2007 Plaintiffs sought agency remedy of 
the problems with the NLCHD concerning Defendants' jurisdiction, the legal establishment of 
public rights in CCR, and Defendants' policies1custoins to widen the road, to issue driveway 
access permits, to damage Plaintiffs' fence and to determine their claimed encroaclment of 
Plaintiffs' fence, including seeking hearings (R, Vol. V, p. 816-817 (On 3121107 Plaintiffs sought 
a post deprivation hearing trying to resolve the issues and were denied a meaningful informal or 
formal hearing or resolution)). Plaintiffs requested that Defendants validate the easement under 
their own resolution under I.C. 5 40-203a (R, Vol. V, p.806-814 (prior to the 3/21/07 meeting 
Plaintiffs sent Defendants a letter requesting that the Commissioiiers validate CCR and bringing 
evidence of the pernlission granting factors for them to do so)); hired a lawyer and sought an 
informal meeting at CCR with Defendants and Plaintiffs' predecessor in the land, Ed Swanson 
(R., Vol. V, p. 877-878, Defendant Hansen's response to Interrogatories Nos. 7, 8, and 9 
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(Commissioner Hailsen acknowledges Plaintiffs' attempts to resolve the issues)). Plaintiffs 
requested that Defendants evaluate their actions for possible due process violations under the 
Idaho Regulatory Takings Act (IRTA) (R, Vol. V, p. 828-837). Defendants not only denied 
Plaintiffs a meaningful predeprivational inquiry into the legal establishment of public rights in 
the road, but also denied post deprivational renledy of exhaustion of agency remedies on the 
grounds that the easement is a public road therefore it is 50 feet wide (R, Vol. V, p. 827 
(Commissioner Hansen expresses his indifference to Plaintiffs' protected property rights- 
"Richard Hansen said the property line issues have nothing to do with the highway district'- 
and that there is "an existing road with a 50 foot prescriptive right of way"; p. 823, L. 20-33 
(both Commissioners Hansen and Clyde express their disregard of the issues-there is no reason 
for them to initiate validation proceedings)). On 8/8/07 Plaintiffs presented a proposal for 
settlement (R, Vol. V, p. 902-908) and the Colnmissioners refused to allow Plaintiffs to represent 
themselves as Plaintiffs would not have the expense of an attorney (R, Vol. V, p. 839, I>. 29-41). 
Plaintiffs requested that the Defendants give them a declaratory ruling on the applicability of I.C. 
5 40-203a (R, Vol. V, p. 826) and Defendants did not respond. On 9115107 Defenda~ts told 
Plaintiffs they had two choices-pay $750 fee for a hearing to regain their land or to get a lawyer 
(R, Vol. V, p. 819-823). On 11/6/07 Plaintiffs filed a tort claim notice (R, Vol. VII, p. 1429, L. 
12, par. 2) and on 3/3/08 Plaintiffs filed for action under 42 USC 5 1983 for the wrongful taking 
of their land and in the alternative tort, trespass, inverse condemnation and nuisance. 
Procedurally, in District Court, Plaintiffs filed initial motions for declaratory judgments 
under I.C. 5 67-8003(3) (R, Vol. I, p. 68-100) and under I.C. § 40-203a (R, Vol. I, p. 176-183) as 
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Plaintiffs had sought agency remedies and were denied a response by the Defendants. These 
requests for declaratory relief were denied; under I.C. 5 40-203a as "advisory" (R, Vol. 11, p. 
255-256); and under both I.C. 5 67-8003(3) and I.C. 5 40-203a as a matter ofjudicial econoil~y 
as the facts needed to be determined in the up coming litigation (R, Vol. 11, p. 258, L. 2-6). 
Subsequently, Plaintiffs then filed three motions for partial summary judgments4 indicating to 
the District Court that CCR had not been laid out and recorded by orders of the commissioners. 
Therefore the width of the easement was limited to the "surface of the roadway"; that the burden 
of proof of the legal establishment of public rights in CCR rested with the Defendants or the 
Defendants needed to validate the legally established public rights in CCR; as they claimed CCR 
was a public road and the location of CCR did not correspond to the location in the public record 
of Plaintiffs' deed description and due to numerous alterations in CCR Defendants could no 
longer accurately determine the legally established width and location of CCR; that Defendants' 
policy/custom for widening a highway, presently existing at a lesser width than 50 feet, was 
facially invalid as they had not legally established a "right of way" under I.C.§§ 40-605 andlor 
1310 to widen the highway; and that Defendants' invasions of and permitting third parties 
4~laintiffs ' Sepiember 19, 2008 Motion is the same as Plaintiffs Moiionfor Pa~tial Summary 
Judgment/Adjudication of the Issue of the A~ullification of the Original Prescriptive Right of Way 
and Subsequent Burden of Proof of Prescription andor Validation ofihe Legally Established 
Right of Way (R. Vol. 11, p. 3 13-321 (motion, brief and affidavit)); Plaintiffs ' Motionfor Partial 
Summary .Judgment/Adjudication ofthe issue of the Facial Validity o f  the NLCHD 's Standing 
Operating Procedure/Policy/Custom of Widening a Prescriptive Right of Way is the same as 
Plaintiffs ' October 6, 2008 Motion (R Vol. 11, p. 324-334 (motion and brief)); Plaint$fi' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment/Adjudication of the issue of the Cause For Action Under 42 USC 
1983 is the same as Plaintiffs' OctoberZI, 2008 Motion (R. Vol. 11, pp. 387-409 (motion, brief 
and affidavit). 
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invasions of Plaintiffs' land and damages to Plaintiffs' fence were final decisions and 
deprivations of Plaintiffs property rights and violations of Plaintiffs 1 4 ~ ' '  Amendnlent rights, 
regardless of the final determination of acquisition by the users of the road as the Defendants had 
enveloped of more of Plaintiffs' land since the late fall of 2005 and after. Plaintiffs asserted 
that their right to due process was absolute. All Plaintiffs' interlocutory motions were denied on 
the basis that the width of the easement needed to be factually determined (R, Vol. IV, pp. 766- 
771 (Plaintiffs' motions for relief as a matter of law are denied as the width of the right of way of 
CCR needed to be factually determined). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether Plaintiffs have propertyllibe~ty rights in the fee of the land, including the right to 
peacefully enjoy their land, their fence, andlor to a jury trial to determine of all the facts 
necessary to establish their 5 1983 case and/or to determine the location, width, and character of 
the easement of CCR as it traverses their land covered by the 14"' Amendment. 
2. Whether Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their property rights when Defendants failed the 
I.C.§40-202 requirement to show five years of public use and maintenance of the lands used to 
widen the surface of CCR or to provide driveway access for the Wagners under their first permit 
and/or when they increase the burden on Plaintiffs, the servient estate, by enveloping more land. 
3. Whether Defendants denied Plaintiffs due process (procedural and substantive) and equal 
protection of the law when they failed to acquire "right of way" under I.C.$§ 40-605 or 13 10 or 
eminent domain or condemnation proceedings, when they were given fair warning they had 
issued the first Wagner driveway access permit for a trespass and failed to respond in a 
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meaningful way, when they failed to give notice to Plaintiffs concerning the Defendants claims 
that Plaintiffs' buffer andlor fence were encroaching , or when they failed to respond to 
Plaintiffs' attempts to exhaust agency remedies. 
4. Whether the District Court erred in granting Defendants summary judgment and attorney fees 
and costs and in denying Plaintiffs declaratory relief, relief as a matter of law, leave to amend 
their complaint, andlor in not sanctioning Defendants for spoliation of the evidence. 
5. Whether Plaintiffs have, as a matter of right, a right to challenge Commissioners'IDefendants' 
andlor the District Court's final decisions which substantially prejudice Plaintiffs' property and 
14"' Amendment rights. 
6. Whether CCR was legally established as a public highway. 
7. Whether I.C.340-2312 adjudicates public rights to a 50 foot prescriptive "right of way". 
8. Whether the identical strip of land for which Defendants claim prescriptive acquisition can be 
accurately identified after Defendants' numerous unrecorded alterations. 
9. Whether Defendants' affidavits were made in bad faith; or whether Defendants were 
improperly augmenting the agency record with their affidavits. 
10. Whether Defendants could lawfully issue a driveway access permit to a third party across 
Plaintiffs' land; or repeatedly damage Plaintiffs' fence and add width to CCR with maintenance. 
1 1. Whether Defendants' failures to allow exhaustion of remedies displayed callous disregard 
and deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' complaints of deprivation of their constitutional rights. 
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12. Whether the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction to rule on Defendants' motion for 
sunmary judgment when the District Court's ruling was not based on the agency record, when 
Plaintiffs sought to exhaust agency remedies. 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
Plaintiffs request attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 USC 3 1988, I.C. $ 5  12-121, 1 17, 
and 40-2013 and costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40 as prevailing party on all issues in this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs appeal the District Court granting summary judgment and attorney fees and 
costs to the Defendants and the denying of partial summary judgments to Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs 
disputed Defendants' jurisdictional "facts" that CCR is "a public highway", "established by 
user" and has "a minimum width of 50 feet mandated by Idaho law" (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 101-1 13; p. 
146, beginning at L. 12 through p. 151, L. 10). As already previously stated in the statement of 
this case, that at cross summary judgment the undisputed material facts show: (i) an easement, 
CCR, exists across Plaintiffs' land; (ii) the "surface of the roadway" of CCR has undergone 
alterations in its width and location in 1996 and again starting in 2005 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 121, L. 22- 
24) (Tr. Vol. I, p. 125, L. 15-24); R, Vol. VII, p. 1432, L. 5-7 (Defendants' brief states that the 
record does establish that CCR was widened in 1996 and 200512006 (emphasis placed by 
Defendants); R, Vol. VI, p. 1210-121 1, pars. 4 and 5 (Defendant Payne's affidavit describes 
widening and that since the late fall of 2005 Defendants have added at least 6-8 feet of width to 
the "surface of the roadway"), (iii) the first Wagner driveway access permit was issued for an 
access wholly on Plaintiffs' land (Tr. Vol. I, p. 122, L. 20-25; p. 123, L. 1-4); (iv) no "right of 
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way" has been laid out and recorded by orders of the corninissioners for CCR; (v) CCR has had 
no official dedication to the public interest; (vi) Defendants have never given Plaintiffs notice of 
encroachment or hearings on these issues; and procedurally (vii) Plaintiffs sought agency 
remedies and were denied a meaningful response by Defendants. Further, factual disputes 
continued as to: (i) the actual location and width of the acquisition of the users of the "surface of 
the roadway" of CCR and (ii) the character of the easement of CCR; as the permission given by 
the previous owner of Plaintiffs' land for the 1996 alterations was disputed by the Defendants. 
These factual disputes were repeatedly pointed out by the District Court through its interlocutory 
rulings (R., Vol. 11, pp. 251-259; R., Vol. 11, pp. 307-312; R., Vol. 11, pp. 763-774) that the width 
of the easement needed to be factually determined. Plailltiffs assert that the undisputed and 
disputed facts show that Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of their property rights covered by 
the 5"' and 14"' Amendments of the US Constitution; as Defendants conducted their activities of 
widening CCR and issuing the first Wagner driveway access permit into lands unencumbered by 
any easement or part of the Defendants' legally established highway system. Furthermore, the 
disputed facts, the accurate location and width and the character of the easement, are not fatal to 
Plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion on the Defendants liability for Plaintiffs' due 
process and equal protection violation claims. The very presence of a protected property right is 
sufficient to rise to the protection of the 14~" Amendment. The undisputed and disputed evidence 
both show doubt of the legal establishment of public rights in CCR as Defendants claim; that due 
to numerous alterations it can no longer be accurately located; and that its present location does 
not agree with the public records. Furthern~ore, Defendants' activities under their policies are 
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proscribed by law-the issuance of a permit for a trespass andlor the wrongful conversion of 
Plaintiffs' land to a private party, not for public use; and encroacl~ment on Plaintiffs' land and 
fence requires notice by law and Plaintiffs have a right of private action to seek agency remedy. 
At cross summary judgment Defendants dropped their factual claim-the prescriptive 50 foot 
width of CCR-and claimed the 50 foot width under statutory [I.C.§40-23 121 authority (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 1 14, starting at line 21 through p. 11 5, L. 22) with the caveats that the "surface of the 
roadway" of CCR had been widened and was located approxiinately the same as it was in 1974. 
Standard of Review: Plaintiffs assert that the District Court was acting in an appellate role in its 
determination of the legal establishment of the public rights in CCR and the standard of review 
must incorporate a review of the agency record as is found in I.C. 3 40-208; as such, this appeal 
would be a matter of right (see I.A.R. 11 (0. Plaintiffs have challenged Defendants' decisions, 
actions andlor failures to act in regards to Defendants' claims to have established public rights in 
the easement which traverses their land under Idaho Code Title 40. See Homestead Farms, Inc. 
v. B'rd of County Comm'rs of Teton County, 141 Idaho 855,858, 119 P.3d 630,633-634 (2005) 
(I.C. 5 40-208 contains standard of review for challenges of Commissioners decisions). 
Where opposing parties both move for summary judgment based on the same evidentiary 
facts and on the same theories and issues, the parties effectively stipulate that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 
(1982). Summary judg~nent is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the case can be decided as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Moss v. Mid- 
American Fire andMarine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298,302,647 P.2d 754,758 (1982). The 
construction and application of a legislative act are pure questions of law as to which the 
Supreme Court exercises free review. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 
980 P.2d 566 (1999). 
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Roeder Holdings, LLC v. Board ofEqualization ofAda Counly, 136 Idaho 809,812,41 P.3d 
237,240 (2001). 
1. The District Court erred in granting Defendants summary judgment and attorney fees 
and costs and denying Plaintiffs partial summary, as Plaintiffs have a valid claim under 5 
1983 (see Addendum, at xvi) with damages to he determined. In Monell v. Dept ofSoc. Svc.s. 
ofN Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-700 (1978) the US Supreme Court stated that a governmental entity is 
liable for its actions under its policies or customs. 
The undisputed evidence in this case finds Defendants acting and failing to act under the 
color of state law in its activities on CCR. The matters of the issuance of the first Wagner 
driveway access permit and the NLCHD maintenance and improvement activities are under the 
policieslcustoms of andlor the expressed approval ofthe final policy makers of the NLCHD (R. 
Vol. IV, p. 632, L. 17-22 (Defendants' policies for maintenance and improvement- 
jurisdictional claims-is based on I.C.§40-2312); Tr., Vol. I, p. 120, L. 14-21 (Defendants 
asserted that I.C.540-23 12 mandates a minimum width of public highways established by user is 
50 feet except for those which had a lesser width in 1887); R. Vol. IV, p. 638, par. 10 (Defendant 
Payne states that there are special circumstances in which I.C.§40-2312 is not the basis for the 
District's public road and maintenance activities-"suc11 as when the District has been deeded a 
public right of way of less than fifty feet wide or when the inlprovement predated the 
establishment of a public road"); R. Vol. VI, p. 1210, par. 3 (Defendant Payne states that there 
are no special circumstances on CCR); Tr. Vol. I, p. 126, L. 9-16 (Defendants' maintenance 
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functions are a matter of right within a 50 foot right of way); R, Vol. VII, p. 1429 pars. 1 and 3 
(the District's activities on CCR are based on Idaho law [I.C.§ 40-23 121)). 
In sum, notwithstanding Defendants' own policy statements negate their legal policy 
thesis-that I.C.540-2312 "mandates" the minimum width of public highways to be 50 feet 
wide-as special circumstances exist, such as highways presently existing at a lesser width-a 
deeded right of way of less than fifty feet is not required to meet the 50 foot standard; 
Defendants also testify that CCR fails to fulfill their cornerstone prerequisite-that CCR is a 
legally established "public" highwaylroad. As was previously stated Defendants deny that any 
official public dedication has ever taken place. Further, Chairman Arneberg , under oath, 
confirms the claimed legal status of CCR-that CCR is a public road, established by 
prescription, 50 feet-25 feet from centerline wide (R. Vol. IV, p. 861, Response to Second 
Interrogatories No. 4). Chairman Arneberg denies that a prescriptive right of waylhighway could 
be less than 50 feet wide (R. Vol. IV, p. 885, Response to Request for Admission No. 5). 
Defendants did not express a rational basis of a legitimate governmental interest to 
require that Plaintiffs or abutting landowners to a prescriptive clainl of a lesser width than 50 feet 
must sustain a greater burden on the servient estate than those abutting and deeding a right of 
way to the county. Furthermore, their "right of way" claim was a result not oE user acquisiiio~i 
but was necessitated by the lnaintenance and improvement requirements of the NLCHD (R. Vol. 
IV, p. 637, par. 6 (in 2005-06 the NLCHD widened CCR for increased vehicular traffic and road 
safety)). Clearly, the envelopment of Plaintiffs' land was for a public benefit and not as a 
regulated harm to the public resultant from Plaintiffs' use oftheir land. 
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Both the agency record and the record initially made in District Court show Plaintiffs 
sought and were denied exhaustion of agency remedies under I.C.@40-203a and 67-8003(3) (R., 
Vol. V, pp. 828-837 (Plaintiffs Regulatory Takings filings)), as well as pre-(R., Vol. V, p. 842 
(the 4/12/06 NLCHD meeting)) and post- (R., Vol. V, pp. 816-17 (the 3/21/07 NLCHD 
meeting); R., Vol. V, pp. 81 9-824 (the 9/12/07 NLCHD meeting)) deprivational hearings. 
Tlie overriding issues in this case are Plaintiffs' challenges of Defendants' decisions, 
inferences, findings, and conclusions to physically invade and to allow third parties to physically 
invade Plaintiffs' land and Defendants' failures to apply and/or to correctly apply statutes with 
provisioiis of constitutional guarantees and remedies for erroneous deprivations In Mavesh v 
State ofIdaho, Dept of Health and Welfave, 132 Idaho221,970 P.2d 14 (1999) the Idaho 
Supreme Court outlined a two step analysis to determine whether a person's 1 4 ' ~  Amendment 
coiistitutional guarantees have been violated. First decide whether the individual's threatened 
interest is a liberty or property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 226, 970 P.3d, at 
19. And after a court finds a liberty or property interest will it reach the next step ofaiialysis, in 
which it determines what process is due. I d ,  at 226,970 P.3d, at 19. At cross summary 
judgment, Plaintiffs asserted that governmental action is required to legally establish public 
rights in CCR. Plai~itiffs asserted that Defendants perjurious affidavits and claims are at best 
arbitrary and capricious-without any evidence in their records to support their findings, 
conclusions, decisions, actions a id  failures to act (Tr. Vol. I, stating at p. 103, L.21 through p 
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A. The  District Court erred when it concluded that Plaintiffs did not have property rights 
protected by the 14"' Amendment; C C R  does not have a 50 foot width as mandated by law. 
Property rights are created or given by state law. Board o f  Regenls ofstate Colleges v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, at 577 (1972). Plaintiffs' deed, instrument No. 42441 1 (R, Vol. VI, p. 1150- 
1151), Latah County, Idaho, provides substantial evidence for the factual finding to support the 
conclusion that Plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected right created by state laws. 
Defendants agree that Plaintiffs' land and property are constitutionally protected (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.142, L. 16 and 17). In Idaho, real property includes land, possessor's rights to land, ditch and 
water rights, mining claims (lode and placer), and free standing timber. See 1.C §§55-101, and 
63-108. In Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,293-296,328 P.2d 397,400-402 (1958) the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that private property of all classifications is protected under the Idaho 
Constitution just co~iipensatioli clause. Plaintiffs' deed description gives Plaintiffs fee title to all 
lands in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM except for the 3+1- acre parcel with its NE 
boundary being the centerline of CCR. Plaintiffs have a lawful fence. See I.C. Title 35. 
Defendants' legal jurisdiction is a strip of land, an easement, and Plaintiffs' ownership 
rights extend to this easement as well. See Meservey v. Gulltford, 14 Idaho 133, 137,93 P. 780, 
783 (1908) (The legal title to said land remains in the owner of the adjoining land or the land 
over which the road runs). The District Court erred when it reduced Plaintiffs' due process claim 
to a tautology. IfI.C.§ 40-2312 mandates a 50 foot prescriptive "right of way" for CCR it must 
contain appropriate procedural constitutional safeguards. See Cleveland Brd Of Ed. F 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) ("'While the legislature may elect not to confer a property 
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interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an 
interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.' Citing Arnett v. Kennedy, at 
416 U .  S. 167). Defendants' ad hoc policy/custom interpretations of I.C.540-23 12-that a public 
highway established by user has an adjudicated minimum 50 foot width mandated by Idaho 
law-are illvalid at their inception. I.C.540-23 12 does not adjudicate public rights to a 50 foot 
width to a highway presently existing at a lesser width, whether the highway is public, 
established by user, dedicated at a lesser width, or otherwise. It has no appropriate, 
coiistitutionally adequate, procedural safeguards to do so. Further, I.C.540-2312 (see Addendum, 
at xix) does not mention the word "public" (see I.C.540-117, at Addendum, p. iii). The District 
Court abused its discretion by seeking an unconstitutional construction when the plain meaning 
was not ambiguous. An appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that 
upholds its constitutio~iality. See American Falls Reservoir Disl. No. 2, v. Idaho Dep 't of Water 
Resources, 143 Idaho 862, at 869, 154 P.3d 433, at 440 (2007). Where the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and there is no 
occasion for the District Court to consider the rules of statutory construction. See Payette River 
Properly Owners Ass'n v. Bd ofCounty Comm'rs, 132 Idaho 551,557,976 P.2d 477,383 
(1 999). Plaintiffs' have substantial ownership rights in the lands underlying and abutting to 
CCR, and their fence and these are protected by the 14~'' Amendment. 
B. Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of their property protected by the 141h Amendment. 
The highway district has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
public rights were established in its entire claim. See ACHD v. TSI, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 365- 
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66, 179 P.3d 323, 328-29 (2008) citing Floyd, 137 Idaho at 724,52 P.3d at 869. The legal 
establislment of the public rights in the easement and Plaintiffs' protected property rights are 
inextricably intertwined. An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific 
purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. See Hodgins 
v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,229,76 P.3d 969,973 (2003). The use of the "surface of the roadway" 
by the users of the road, whether the users are public or private, has not interfered with Plaintiffs' 
use of their land for a buffer to protect their fence, to permit reasonable snow storage, to grow 
trees and raise livestock until the late fall of 2005, if at all then. However, since that time the 
Defendants have invaded and pernlitted third parties to invade Plaintiffs' land (Tr., Vol. I, p. 105, 
from L. 18 though p. 106, L. 15). It is the Defendants' exertion of their governmental authority 
at which Plaintiffs' Complaint is directed. 
The con~missioners of a highway district have exclusive general supervision and 
jurisdiction over all highways and public-rights-of-way within their highway system. See Idaho 
Code 3 40-13 10(1) (Addendum, at p. xvi). Defendants have 1x0 jurisdiction beyond the extent of 
the easement and have no authority to regulate Plaintiffs' use of their land. The power to 
establish highways rests in the State legislature and the exertion of governmental authority in 
laying out a highway is only valid as legislature provides. See Gooding Hwy. Dist. v. Idaho 
Irrigation Co., 30 Idaho 232, 236-37, 164 P 99, I00 (1917). The requirements for determining if 
a highway exists and what lands are within the Defendants' highway system are set forth in I.C. 
3 40-202 (see Addendum, at p. iv). I. C. 3 40-202(3) states that there are specific ways in which 
a public highway may be created and provides in part: 
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Highways laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2) of this 
section [by acquiring real property and then adopting a resolution establishing as interest 
in the property as a highway], by order of a board of commissioners, and all highways 
used for a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at 
the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of coininissioners, 
are highways. 
Homestead firms, Inc., at 860,110P.3d 630, 635. As has been stated no "right of way", 50 foot 
wide, 25 feet from centerline wide, or otherwise has been laid out or located and recorded by 
orders of the coinmissioners on CCR. Thus any highway which exists across Plaintiffs' land is 
limited to what land has been used for a period of five years and kept up at the public expense- 
the "surface of the roadway", the slope of CCR. These procedures are well established and 
reasonably understood. See Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513, 518-519,373 P.2d 929,932 (1962), citing 
Ross v. Swearingen, 39 Idaho 35,225 P. 1021 (Appellants had the burden of establishing the 
existence of the public road described in the petition to prove that the road had been laid out and 
recorded as a highway by order of the board of cornmissioners, or that it had been used as such 
for a period of five years). An easement by prescription requires a showing by claimant of the 
line of travel without material change or variation. See Roberts v. Swim, 1 17 Idaho 9, 15, 784 
P.2d 339, 345 (Ct. App. 1989). The undisputed material facts-that material changes in the 
location and width of the "surface of the roadway" of CCR have occurred within the last five 
years-provide substantial evidence in the District Court record to support a finding and a 
conclusion that Defendants have enveloped more of Plaintiffs' land as Defendants have not 
legally acquired a "right of way" for their n~ailitenance and improvement activities. 
A judgment determining the existence of an easement must also specify the character, 
width, length, and location. See Schneider 1). Nowe, 142 Idaho 767,774, 133 P.3d 1232, 1239 
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(2006). The disputed evidence in this case amounts not to whether there is a 50 foot-25 feet 
from centerli~~e "right of way" but rather what is the legal width and location of the "surface of 
the roadwaym-where does the identical strip of land used and maintained for five years lie? See 
ACHD, at 365-66,179 P.3d 323,328-29 (citing Aztec, Ltd., Inc. v. Creekside Investment Co., 100 
Idaho 566,602 P.2d 64 (1979) (the case was decided on the failure to meet the requirement to 
show use for five years). Defendants acknowledge the alterations in the surface of the road and 
also aclmowledge the inadequacies of their procedures to fulfill constitutional guarantees (Tr., 
Vol. I, pp. 133, L. 21-25; 134, L. 1-9 (Defendants acknowledge that they have altered the CCR 
centerli~le and cannot even by survey, after the fact, ascertain the accurate location of CCR). 
The District Court erred when it ruled that CCR could be accurately located by a 
moveable-fixed centerline. Defendants' counsel changed and/or misstated (Tr. Vol. I, p. 121, 
L. 19-21) the evidence that the centerline of CCR is the now as it was in 1974~. Plaintiffs 
hotly dispute this conclusion and Defendants do not dispute the alterations in the centerline (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 133, L. 21-23). (Tr. Vol. I, p. 121, L. 15-21) and the statement that the centerline or the 
width of CCR is the same now as in 1974 is unsubstantiated by any evidence in the agency or 
District Court record. 
Defendants' counsel tries to paint a picture that CCR over the years has been altered 
sy~nmetrically when in fact it hasn't. There are no public or agency records that CCR occupies 
the identical strip of land it did prior to the 1996 alteration or the 2005-2006 alterations or any 
alterations since. Defendants' counsel misstates the record. CCR rests on a steep canyon wall 
with a large rock outcropping on the SE (Wagner) side of the road. This large rock outcropping, 
the reason for the 1996 realignment of CCR, was blasted with little success in 2006 and remains 
as an obstacle for widening CCR symmetrically even if Defendants had a 50 foot right of way to 
do so (R., Vol. IV, p.637, par. 6; and R., Vol. VI, pp. 1210-1 1, pars. 4 and 5). 
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Further, the Defendants were improperly augmenting the public record with their claims 
of measurements (R., Vol. IV, pp. 637-38, pars. 5,6,7,  11 and 12; R., Vol. VI, pp. 1210, pars. 3, 
4, and 5) being made to accurately describe the 1996 alterations and the placement of additional 
width to the "surface of the roadway" in 2005 and 2006 as there was no such agency record of an 
accurate description of the lands as is required for any of the Defendants' alterations. See Idaho 
Historic Preservation Council, Inc, at 654, 8 P.3d 646, at 649 (when a governing body sits in a 
quasi-judicial capacity it must confine its decision to the record produced at the public hearing 
and failing to do so violates procedural due process of law). Defendants have duty to produce 
record of highway alterations. See I.C.§§40-604(1), (2) and (4), at Addendum, p. xiv and 608 at 
Addendum, p. xvi. In sum, the Defendants' unlawful intrusions into Plaintiffs' land under their 
policies for maintenance and improvement has not only deprived Plaintiffs of their substantial 
property rights, but has also put a valuable public asset, the "surface of the roadway" of CCR at 
risk and expense of a lawsuit. The centerline of CCR forms the NE boundary between Plaintiffs 
and the Wagners. Defendants' failure to lay out, describe, and record in 1996 and since the late 
fall of 2005 has prejudiced both Plaintiffs' and the neighbors' property rights. 
C. Defendants have violated Plaintiffs procedural and substantive due process and equal 
protection rights. Plaintiffs' rights to procedural due process is constitutionally guaranteed as a 
significant property right is at stake, and is not denied as a matter of tort claim notice or 
regardless of the outcome of the factual determination of the width, location, use, or character of 
the easement. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,266-267 (1978). The right to due process is 
"absolute". Id. The denial of due process is actionable without proof of actual injury. Id. 
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Plaintiffs assert that their property riglxts have bee11 prejudiced as Defendants decisions, 
conclusions, actions and/or failures to act are in violation of andlor are in excess of statutory 
and/or constitutional provisions; are arbitrary and capricious or characterized by abuse of 
discretion; are clearly erroneous based on the undisputed and disputed facts and/or the agency 
record; are effected by errors of law; and/or have been made upon uniawful procednre. Plaintiffs 
assert that Defendants have failed to circumscribe their broad authorities with statutory 
provisions and safeguards of constitutional guarantees and remedies for erroneous deprivations; 
The District Court erred in its conclusion that Plaintiffs were not denied due process when 
alterations in the easement were made (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1466-1472, pars. A.4. through B.1, 2, 
and 3). Invasions of Plaintiffs' land are final when they occur. See Sinaloa Lake Owners 
Association v. City ojSimi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1402 (1988) (Williamson County's final 
decision requirement is inapplicable in cases of physical invasion; a physical invasion is by 
definition a final decision). Invasions by third parties are particularly egregious. See Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan,, CATVCorp., 458 U.S. 419,435-38 (1982). Physical takings are not 
determined by their size. See The City ofCoeur D' Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 847, 136 
P.3d 3 10, 3 18 footnote n. 5 ("The regulatory takings tests, expressed in Loretto (regulation 
approving of physical invasion, however minute, is a taking")). Absence of due process andlor 
not "for public use" are substantive violations. See Lingle v. Chevron, USA Inc., 544 U . S .  528, 
543 (2005) (" if a governlnent action is found to be i~nperrnissible - for instance because it fails 
to meet the "public use" requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process - that is the end 
of the inquiry. No amount of cornpensation can authorize such action"). Predeprivation due 
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process is due in substantive due process violations and in procedural due process violations 
when the violati011 is not unauthorized, foreseeable and predictable. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 
U.S. 1 13, 124-139 (1990) (predeprivational hearing is required when action is not unauthorized, 
foreseeable and predictable). See also Zimmerman v. Cily ofOakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737-739 
(9"' Cir. 2001). Post deprivatioual due process, while may be adequate in some cases, exhaustion 
of agency remedies is not required. See Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents 457 U.S. 496, 501 
(1982) (exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a perquisite for seeking action under 5 
1983). See Zinermon, at 124-125 (exhaustion ofjudicial remedies is not required under 5 1983). 
The matter of tort claim notice is not material in the issues and remedies available: Idaho Tort 
Claims Act does not cover the matters of trespass, nuisance, inverse condemnation and 42 USC 5 
1983 makes no requirement of a tort claim notice. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 13 1, 138-146 
(1 988). Further any time bar of Plaintiffs' actions "accrues after the full extent of the 
impairment of the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of [the property] becomes apparent". See The 
City of Coeur D'  Alene, at 846, 136 P.3d 310,3 17 citing Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 
667,671,603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979) (quoting Aaron v. Unitedstates, 31 1 F.2d 798,802 (Ct.CI. 
1963)). The Defendants have no immunity for violations of the statutes or the Constitution. See 
Owen v. City ofindependence, 445 U.S. 622,635-640 (1980). Plaintiffs have a right to 
challenge the final decisions, inferences, conclusions, and findings of the Defendants when they 
adversely affect Plaintiffs' property rights and a right to appeal the District Court's rulings while 
acting in an appellate role. See I.A.R.Rule (I l)(f). See Homestead, supra, at 858, 119 P.3d 630, 
633-634). Further, successful claims of a "class of one" are brought about by intentional 
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arbitrary difference in treatment without a rational basis whether by expressed terms of statute or 
improper execution by officials. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech 528 1.l.S. 562, 564 (2000) 
See also The CityofCoeur d2lene at 853, 136 P.3d 310, 324. 
It is well established law in Idaho that alterations in width andlor location of an easement 
not only increases the burden on the servient estate, but also have the effect of enveloping more 
land. See Argosy Trusl Through Its Trustee, Alan Andrews v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, at 573, 
114 P.3d 128, at 13 1, (2005) (citing Aztec Lfd., Ind. V. Creekside Investment Co., 100 Idalio 566, 
569,602 P.2d 64,67 (1 979), ("An increase in width does more than merely increase the burden 
upon the servient estate; it has the effect of enveloping additional land"). The Supreme Court 
says the saine argument goes for alteration of location of the easement. See Bruce Byron Bedke 
v. Pickelf Ranch Aridsheep Co., an Idaho Corporation, 143 Idaho 36,39, 137 P.3d 423,426 
(2006) (citing Argosy Trust ex reel. Ils Truslee and Aztec Ltd,  Inc. (the same is true with respect 
to the change in the location of an easement; it has the effect of enveloping more land). 
Defendants knew or should have known that the alterations of the width andlor location of the 
"surface of the roadway" of CCR would envelop more of Plaintiffs' land. 
It is also well established law in Idalio that adverse use is one of the five elements 
necessary to establish a prescriptive easement. See Hodghs, at 231,76 P.3d 969, at 975. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has characterized "adverse use", as an actual invasion or infringement 
made without permission of the owner. Id. Adverse use, hostile use and/or under a claim of 
right are synonymous. Id. Such adverse use by the Defendants is expressly prohibited by the US 
Constitution 5th and 14th Amendments and the Idaho State Constitution, Article I $3 13 and 14. 
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Plaintiffs have not argued that Defendants cannot acquire Plaintiffs' land; they have 
asserted that Defendants carnot take their land without due process. Plaintiffs argue that the 
Defendants have no authority to create a prescriptive "right of way" and Defendants' claims are 
made upon unlawful procedure andlor affected by other errors of law. The Idaho State 
legislature has provided Defendants with authorizing statutes for altering CCR-such as I.C.jj§ 
40-13 10 (see Addendum p. xvi) or 605 (see Addendum, p. xv)--containing procedural safeguards 
of Plaintiffs' constitutional guarantees to obtain and fix a strip of land, a "right of way", for their 
maintenance and improve~nent activities that is not based on an oxymoronic fixedlvariable claim. 
The District Court acknowledged that the authorizing statute for widening a highway falls under 
I.C.§§ 40-605 and 1310 (R. Vol. IV, pp. 763-774, par. 2 (the District Court acknowledged that 
the authority to alter a road falls under I.C.§§ 40-1310 or 605)). 
Predeprivation procedural safeguards would have been of value in preventing the 
deprivation of Plaintiffs' property. A deprivation of Plaintiffs' propelly rights is not 
unpredictable when Defendants are planning to alter a road or when Plaintiffs attended the 
4/12/06 NLCHD meeting which was also attended by all necessary parties (R., Vol. V, pp. 864- 
66, (Chairman Arneberg's response to Interrogatory No. 12 indicating presence of the Wagners 
at the 4/12/06 meeting); R., Vol. V, pp. 842 (Bob Wagner speaks at the meeting)). It is 
foreseeable that alterations in the "surface of the roadway" and issuance of access permits across 
Plaintiffs' land have an adverse effect on Plaintiffs' property rights. It is predictable that 
deprivations of Plaintiffs' land will occur when Defendants issue driveway access permits 
trespass on Plaintiffs' land and add width and alter the location of the easement. The Idaho 
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legislature has given Defendants the broad authorities to alter CCR and to issue encroachment 
permits. I'redeprivation due process is due when the violation is not unauthorized, foreseeable 
and predictable. 
Defendants have never given Plaintiffs notice that their fence was encroaching on the 
right of way. See I.C.§§40-23 17 alid 23 19, at Addendum, p. xix (notice is required for 
encroachment and fences). Defendants had opportunity to formalize their policies or give 
Plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity to challenge their inferences, findings, or conclusions at a 
meaningful time in a meaningful way. Defendant Payne stated that Plaintiffs' fence was within 
their "right of way" (R., Vol. IV, p. 639, par. 12) and that the cause ofthe damage to Plaintiffs' 
fence was that it was in the "right of way" (R., Vol. V, p. 859, Defendant Payne's response to 
Interrogatory No. 28). Defendant Hansen states that property line issues have nothing to do with 
the NLCI4D (R., Vol. V, p.817, L. 5-6) and that there is an existing road with a 50 foot right of 
way (R., Vol. V, p.817, L. 15-16). The Defendants made legal conclusions and applied general 
laws to Plaintiffs' specific situation. See Idaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc., at 65 1 ,  654, 
8 P.3d 646, at 649 (2000) (the action is judicial if general laws are applied to specific individuals, 
interests, or situations citing Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 
Idaho 407,614 P.2d 947 (1980) (quoting Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23,27 
(Or, 1973))). The issuance of the first Wagner driveway access permit was unlawful-for a 
trespass. See The City of Coeur D' Alene at, 846, 136 P.3d 3 10, at 3 17 (a permit cannot be 
issued for an unlawful act). Plaintiffs' property right lies in the fee of their land and not in the 
Wagners' access permit or in Defendants' invalid interpretation of I.C.§40-23 12. Further, it was 
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unlawful whether public rights have been legally established to 50 feet or not. The Highway 
District does not have title in fee simple to the easement and even if it did the Defendants could 
not convert Plaintiffs' land to a third party's use. See Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 507,65 
P.3d 525, 529 (2003) (even a deeded easement does not give the public the same right to sell or 
dispose of the same that a private party has to land for which he holds the title in fee simple 
(citing Idaho Code 5 55-309 (2002))). 
Plaintiffs sought agency remedy to resolve the issues and the continued onslaughts on 
their buffer and fence. Although not required to do so under § 1983, it is sometimes held that 
where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the 
administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act. See American Falls 
Reservoir Dist. No. 2, at 869, 154 P.3d 433, at 440. Plaintiffs had right to remedy under the 
statutory provisions of I.C. $5 40-203a (see Addendum, at p. x)-requesting validation of CCR 
initiated under the commissiollers own resolution6-and under 67-8003(3) (see Addendum, at p. 
xxi) (R., Vol. V, pp. 828-837 (Plaintiffs' Requests for Regulatory Takings Analysis filings 
seeking evaluation of the Defendants' administrative actions). Defendants misrepresented I.C. 
5 5  40-203a as Plaintiffs' obligation to pay a $750 fee and file a petition for validation (Tr. Vol. 1: 
p. 20, L. 10-1 7; p. 21, L. 13-22); (R., Vol. V, p. 820, beginning at L. 38 through p. 822, Line 13 
'Plaintiffs presented evidence to the Defendants on 3/21/07 and requested that the 
Commissioners validate CCR under their own resolution (R. Vol. V, p. 806, Plaintiffs' letter to 
the Commissioners prior to the requested time of the agenda ("Whether this can be addressed by 
a process of deeded easement, highway validation, eminent domain or some other process, we 
submit it for your consideration")) to determine the legal establishment of the easement (R. Vol. 
V, pp. 806-814; pp. 816-81 7 (minutes of NLCHD meeting on 3/21/07). 
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and p. 823, L. 20 through L. 33) and as a predeprivation process (R. Vol. IV, p. 632, L. 9-15 
("...Idaho Code 5 40-203 A provides a predeprivation process.. .")). Defendants' counsel 
misrepresented 1.C.Q: 67-8003(3) as not pertaining to the issues (R. Vol. V, p. 821, L. 20 
(Landeck says the filings do not relate to the proceedings). On 9/12/07 Defendants indicated a 
final decision that they were not going to allow exhaustion of the remedies and gave Plaintiffs 
the choice to pay a $750 fee for a hearing or to get a lawyer (R., Vol. V, p. 823, L. 31-33 
(Landeck said the Halvorsons' first step should be to hire a lawyer; Sherman Clyde said Mr 
Halvorsoll should just hire a lawyer). These issues were brought up in District Court7 as 
Plaintiffs initially sought declaratory reliefunder I.C. 5s 40-203a and 67-8003(3). Plaintiffs 
asserted that they had a right to private action-they were asking a private question, violation of 
their protected property rights-not a public one-was the road "public" or private? See Dopp v 
Idaho Commission ofpardons and Parole, 144 Idaho 402,406-407, 162 P.3d 781,785-86 
(Ct.App. 2007) (Court of Appeals indicates when a person, as a member of the class of persons 
the law was enacted to protect may seek action for violations of the statute to assure 
effectiveness of the statute). Defendants claimed CCR was a "public highway", 50 feet-25 feet 
from centerline wide Plaintiffs sought validation of the legally established public rights in the 
road. The statutels, I.C$$ 40-203a, 208, and 67-8003(3) were for Plaintiffs benefit. Plaintiffs 
had a vested right in the statutes. Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants had a duty to validate the 
easement under their own resolution (I. C.5 40-203a) to substantiate their claims andlor to 
R. Vol. I, pp. 176-224 (Plaintiffs' I.C. $40-203a motion, affidavit and brief for declaratory 
judgment); R. Vol. I, pp. 68-164 (Plaintiffs' I.C. $ 67-8003(3) lnotion and brief for declaratory 
judgment); R., Vol. 11, pp. 262-293 (Plaintiffs' motion and brief for reconsideration). 
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evaluate the issues under I.C.3 67-8003(3). Defendants' defense of no final decision was 
frivolous. Payment of the $750 fee requirement is inappropriate as it just adds additional injury 
to Plaintiffs and initiation under the Commissioners' resolutioil is required by law. See Havvis 
v. County ofRivevside, 904 F.2d 497 at 501-503 (plaintiff was required to pay a fee to regain the 
use of his land of which he had already been deprived of was a concrete injury in and of itself). 
Plaintiffs asserted that declaratory judgment under 1.C.S 40-203a was proper as Plaintiffs' 
motion was not advisory; as Plaintiffs' Complaint and motion were justiciable. See Musk~at v. 
UnitedStates, 219 U.S. 346, 359-363 (191 1). Plaintiffs were seeking validation of the legal 
establishment of CCR, not the coi~stitutionality of I.C.5 40-2312. There was no multiplicity of 
cases in the present case. See Scott v. Agricultural Products Corp, Inc., 102 Idaho 147, 149,627 
P.2d 326, 328 (1981). Plaintiffs filed for declaratory relief under their civil case-two separate 
cases did not exist. The District Court abused its discretion to deny declaratory relief on I.C.3 
40-203a and/or on I.C.5 67-8003(3) on the basis ofjudicial economy as the prolonging of the 
litigation (Tr., Vol. I, p. 48 beginning at L. 19 through p. 50, L. 20 (Defendants' counsel argues 
an evidentiary hearing is necessary)) andlor search for the facts was unwarranted and as 
Plaintiffs sought Defendants' liability for due process violations for alleged per se takings. If 
there was not doubt to the legality of the claimed established rights Defendants could have 
brouglt forth motion for summary judgment then and not a year later. If there was doubt, the 
District Court could have remanded the validation back to the agency. Both matters were 
reviewable as a matter of agency record under I.C. § 40-208 and the IAPA and therefore 
appealable as a matter of right under I.A.R. 1 I(f). See Homestead, at 858, 119 P.3d 630,633- 
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634. Further Plaintiffs had the private right to assert statutory violations. The second prong of 
Williamson Cnty Planning v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-197 (1985) that Plaintiffs must 
seek just compensation is inapplicable as just co~npensatioil implies that due process was 
afforded, whether properly done or not. See Lingle, supra. Neither party suggests that due 
process was afforded, even inadequately (R., Vol. V, p. 821 (9112107 NLCHD meeting; Ron 
Landeck says no proceeding has been before the commissioners). Defendants cannot silnply rule 
by fiat under I.C.§40-23 12. Furthermore, without substantial evidence in their records to support 
their findings, conclusions and decisions on the width, location, use, andlor character of the 
"surface of the roadway" all Defendants' actioilslfailures to act are arbitrary and capricious, 
illegal andlor an abuse of Defendants' discretion. See Enterprise, Inc, v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 
734, 536 P.2d 729 (1975) (an action is arbitrary if it was done without a rational basis; if it was 
done in disregard of the facts and circninstances presented or without adequate determining 
principles). 
In Armstrong v. US., 364 U.S.40, at 49 (1960) the US Supreme Court held that the 
legitimate governmental interest in a taking was to spread the burden to the public as a whole. 
Defendant Payne expressed Defendants' reason for the CCR alterations since 2005 was for the 
benefit of the public (R., Vol. IV, p. 637, par. 6 (widened the traveled surface for reasons to 
improve road safety for increased vehicular travel); not a harmful Plaintiffs' use of their land. 
The Defendants have offered no rational basis of a legitimate governmental interest to regulate or 
have shown Plaintiffs' use of their land is unsafe, immoral, unhealthful, or causes a dinlinution 
the public's general welfare. Defendants have no legal authority to conclude Plaintiffs' use of 
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their land creates a nuisance. See I.C. 5 22-4504 (Addendum, at ii). Defendants' jurisdiction is 
limited to highways and public rights of way (see 1.C. 5 40-1310 (1) (Addendum, at xvi). At best 
Defendants' denial of the exhaustion of agency remedies shows deliberate indifference and 
callous disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional-5"' Amendment (Bill of Rights) as covered by the 
14Ih Amendment. 
D. Defendants' claims to regulate the use of Plaintiffs' land as a "right of way" are not 
supported by the undisputed facts nor do they have any legal merit. Defendants' and the 
District Court's case law citations do not support such claims. Defendants' and the District 
Court's theory that Mesevvey h d  its progeny [Bentel v. Bannock County, 104 Idaho 130,656 
P.2d 1383 (1983)l provide a rational basis for an unconstitutional expansion of the width or 
alteration in the location of a prescriptive easement is without legal merit. See Argosy Trust 
Through Its Trustee, Alan Andrews, at 573, 114 P.3d 128, at 131 (There is a difference between 
the enlargement in the use permitted by the owner of the dominant estate and the enlargement of 
the physical dimensions of the easement). In Bentel the Bentels, conceded the public rights in 
tile "surface of the roadwayn-there is no mention of a 50 foot "right of way". The Idaho 
Supreme Court does not conflate use with width or location and held that the installation of 
sewage disposal pipelines within an existing roadway does not expand the burden to the servient 
estate a i d  that such increased use could fill the entire prescriptive easement. The holdings of 
Mesevvey do not suggest anything comparable to a conflated notion that the alterations in the 
location and/or width are permissible expansions of the "uses" of an unrecorded prescriptive 
easement. I11 Meservey the Idaho Supreme Court cited Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah 341,44 
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Pac. 1032, with the contemplation of the question how the width of a public highway by 
prescription is determined 
[Tlhe width must be deterniined from a consideration of the facts and c~rciunstances 
peculiar to the case, because in such event the court cannot say that any highway is of a 
certain width "in the absence of statutory provisions. 
Id, at 93 P.780,784 (1908). The Supreme Court clearly did not see thc predecessor to 2312 as 
demanding a specified width for a prescriptive highway. The Idaho Supreme Court held in 
Meservey that the road overseer could not enforce road encroachment statute for a prescriptive 
right of way which had not been laid out and recorded, Id., at 146-147,93 P. 780,782-783 
The ~is t ' r ic t  Court also failed to note the obvious differences of the present case with its 
case citation of ACIfD. That case differs from the present case in several significant ways. In 
ACHD. the disruptor of the status quo was the abutting landowner who built a fence in a part of 
an existing alleyway which had been dedicated to the public in 1906 to which the users had 
extended the width of to avoid misplaced power poles in 1957. This new usage by the public to 
avoid the power poles was greater than five years in duration-the users had acquired the land by 
time and use. In the present case, the disruptors of the status quo, the Defendants, owe Plaintiffs 
due process for lands not yet acquired by the users and not previously laid out and recorded 
Further the District Court failed to comprehend that District of Colunzbia v. Robinson, 
180 U.S. 928. follows the same well established implied course as I.C.5 40-202(3) (R., Vol. IV, 
District of Columbia and I.C. 5 40-202 follow the same plan: Harewood Road was a 
prescriptive claim as it had not been laid out and recorded; therefore the width of the easement 
equaled the width ofthe road and the determination of the width was a matter properly before the 
jury as a matter of adverse use of the users; the Levy was denied its defense of "good faith for its 
failure to survey. There are differences in the prescriptive period and the legislature required the 
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pp. 766-67 (District Court suggests that the width of CCR is determined by something other than 
(i) what has been laid out or located and recorded or (ii) been used and maintained for a given 
period of time; and that something other is to be factually determined as in a prescriptive or 
adverse use claim). 
E. CCR has not been legally established as a "public" highway and Plaintiffs have a right 
to challenge the truthfulness of Defendants' affidavits. Public status of a roadway can be 
established by proof of regular maintenance and extensive public use. See ACIiD, at 365-66,179 
P.3d 323, 328-29. Defendants are not permitted to validate public rights in a highway under 
their own resolution except under certain circumstances. See Galvin v. Canyon County High. 
Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576, 579,6 P.3d 826, 829 (2000) ("Section 40-203A may only be used to 
validate an existing highway or public right of way about which there is some kind of doubt. It 
does not allow for the creation of new public rights"). Placing CCR on the District's map does 
not adjudicate public status in CCR. See Ifomestead, at 862, 119 P.3d 630, at 637 (Justice 
Eislnann specially concurring, added that public rights are not legally established under I. C. § 
40-202 and that evidence is required in the agency record to place a prescriptive highway on the 
map). The legal "pu~blic" status of CCR is a legal conclusion based on factual findings of 
substantial evidence in the agency record. See I.C.340-203a(2)(3) (Addendum, at x). In 
summary judgment affidavits cannot be presented in bad faith-simply to delay and harass. See 
Levy to lay and record all highways in the District to determine the proper location and width; 
whereas in Idaho the determination of the width is left to the discretion of the authorities in 
charge of n~aintenance, and a statutory width may be acquired if the authorities choose to do so, 
I.C. 40-605. 
APPELLATE BRIEF 
I.R.C.P. Rule 56(g). See I;i.ank.s v. Delaiuave, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978) (right to challenge 
the truthfulness of affidavits rests within the 14"' Amendment). 
Defendants brought forth affidavits in bad faith indicating that CCR had been legally 
established as a public road but brought forth no agency record to support their conclusory 
statements. The Defendants under oath state that CCR is a public road (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1458, 
beginning at L. 19 to p. 1459, L. 7 (District Court notes affidavits of Ameberg and Carscallen)); 
see also affidavits of Dan Payne (R., Vol. IV, p. 638, pars. 10 and 11 (describes CCR as a public 
road); R., Voi. VI, p. 1210, par. 3 (describes CCR as a public road); see also Chairman 
Arneberg's response to Plaintiffs' interrogatories to describe the legal establishment of CCR (R., 
Vol. V, p. 861, Interrogatory No. 4 (CCR is a public road, 50 feet-25 feet from centerline wide)); 
and Defendants' counsel at oral argument (Tr., p. 119, L. 5-8 (Defendants' counsel testifies that 
Dan Payne states CCR has been a public road since 1974)). The District Court erred by failing 
to ascertain that CCR was legally dedicated to the public and was properly put on the District's 
map, by not reviewing the agency record. The District Court erred when it stated that CCR was 
a "public" road based on Plaintiffs' failure to dispute it as it holds no value to the legal 
establishment of CCR. 
2. The District Court erred in denying Plaintiffs' interlocutory motions for partial 
summary judgments on the basis that the width of CCR needed to be factually determined. 
The District Court's denials of declaratory relief (R., Vol. 11, pp. 251-59; R., Vol. 11, pp. 307-12)) 
and/or relief as a matter of law (R., Vol. IV, pp. 763-72) were without legal merit as Plaintiffs 
have a property right protected by the 14"' Amendment. The factual determination of the width 
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of CCR is not dispositive of Plaintiffs' due process (procedural andlor substantive) andlor equal 
protection claims as Defendants had not laid out or located and recorded CCR or a "right of 
way" for CCR andlor CCR had not been officially dedicated as public. See Evers v. County of 
Custer, 745 F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The issue is whether the County may make a 
deter~nination that those requirelnents have been met and enforce its co~lclusion that the road is 
public without giving Evers prior notice and an opportunity to present argulnent and evidence 
that the road was her private property"). See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,80-93 (1972) 
(interest of chattels was sufficient for them to invoke procedural due process safeguards). 
3. Defendants are estopped from asserting and disputing the same facts or evidence. 
In Floyd v. Bd of Comm 'rs ofRonneville County, 137 Idaho 718,726,52 P.3d 863,871 
(2002) the Idaho Supreme Court indicates that quasi estoppel prevents a party fiom asserting a 
right, to the detriment of another party, which is inconsistent with a position previously taken. 
Defendants are estopped from claiming a rational basis of the issuance of the first Wagner 
driveway access permit based on the accuracy of the deed description of 699 feet of road 
frontage and then denying the accuracy of the deed as being significant of movement of CCR in 
the deed's description of the intersection points of the east and west p~operty lines of the 3+1- 
acre parcel with CCR. The discrepancies (R, Vol. V, p. 807-812 (Plaintiffs' letter describing the 
shift in the 3+/- acre parcel) between the deed disruption and the Rimrock Survey [and as 
Amended] Vol. VI, pp. 1155 (survey)-1 156 (amended survey)) are significant-the 3+1- acre 
parcel had lost 200 feet of road frontage and the parcel itself had geographically shifted 50 feet 
to the north. Further Defendants are estopped from asserting that CCR is "a public highway" for 
APPELLATE BRIEF 
benefit of their specious claim of a 50 foot right of way mandated for CCR and then denying that 
CCR has ever been officially dedicated to the public interest for denying the permission given 
for the 1996 alteratio~is to CCR by Ed Swanson. Further Defendants are estopped from claiming 
prescriptive acquisition to lands that Plaintiffs were denied declaratory judgment on as being 
unused-"no final decision" and/or "advisoryn-implying that they were regulating the use of 
Plaintiffs' undeveloped land next to the "surface of the roadway". 
4. Defendants have intentionally destroyed evidence of the legal location and width of CCR 
and should be sanctioned for spoliation of the evidence. In Courtney v. Big "0" Tires, Inc., 
139 Idaho 821, 87 P 3d. 930 (2003) the Idaho Supreme Court explained the ramificatiolls of 
intentional destruction of evidence. Thus, the doctrine of spoliation provides that when a party 
with a duty to preserve evidence intentionally destroys it, an inference arises that the destroyed 
evidence was unfavorable to that party. Id., at 824, 87 P 3d. 930, at 933. Spoliation is a rule of 
evidence applicable at the discretion of the trial court. Id. CCR has been altered in location and 
width in a i d  since 2005. The Defendants have a duty of to purchase necessary right of way (see 
I.C.3 40-604) (1)and (7) (Addendum, at p xiv)); a duty to ensure that no private property is taken 
(see I.C. 5 40-605) (Addendum, at p xv)); a duty to accurate records of altering highways (I.C.4 
40-608) (Addendum, at p xvi)); a duty to convey and record (I.C.5 40-2302) (Addendum, at p 
xviii)); and a duty to maintain a valid jurisdiction (I.C.9513 I0 (Addendum, at p xvi)), and 203a 
(Addendunz, at p x)) and the burden of proof that they are within their easement (I.C.4 40-202) 
(Addendum, at p iv)). The centerline of the easement is the property line between the Wagners 
and Plaintiffs. Trespass is an intentional tort. The question of intent here being a matter of 
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reckless action or a high degree of probability of harnl-an objective standard of constructive 
knowledge as opposed to a subjective state of mind. The only evidence of an unrecorded 
prescriptive easement is its "as is where is" precedent condition for 5 years. The District Court 
erred by denying Plaintiffs' motion for spoliation of evidence. 
5. Plaintiffs have a right to amend their complaint as the Defendants continued their 
maintenance and improvement activity and repeatedly damaged Plaintiffs' fence every 
time Plaintiffs repaired it. Without declaratory relief or relief as a matter of law Plaintiffs are 
powerless to stop Defendants' continued invidious onslaughts on their property. The District 
Court was aware of the continuation of Defendants' activities and made no assessments as to 
deficiencies in Plaintiffs' Conzplaint save for the need to factually determine the width of the 
easement-the burden of proof which rested upon the Defendants. 1.R.C.P Rule 1 in part reads, 
"These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination 
of every action and proceeding". In Foman v. Davi,s 371 U.S. 178, 181-182 (1962) the US 
Supreme Court quoted Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, at 48, "The Federal Rules reject the 
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the 
outcome, and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on 
the n~erits." The leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given. Id. Of course, the 
grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but 
outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an 
exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the 
Federal Rules. Id. Since filing of their Complaint the NLCHD has continued to advance its 
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improvement activity and has underinined and damaged trees at the edge of the road and pushed 
more rock into Plaintiffs' buffer and needlessly piled snow on the fence in the winter of 2008-09 
The District Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff leave to amend their complaint. 
6. The District Court erred in granting Defendants attorney fees and costs. A final decision 
or order of the district court on judicial review of an agency decision is appealable as a matter of 
right. See I.A.R. Rule 1 l(f). Plaintiffs sought agency remedy and were denied on a claim of a 
public right of way of 50 feet. The District Court denied Plaintiffs declaratory relief in lieu of a 
factual determination on the Defendants' claims of "no final decision" and on a determination 
that Plaintiffs sought an advisory declaration of their rights. Defendants' counsel could have 
easily asked the State's Attorney General for advice on how to interpret I.C.340-23 12. The 
Constitution is intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories. 
UnitedStates v.Dickinson, 33 1 U .  S. 745, 748 (1947). Further, the right to be heard does not 
depend upon an advance showing that one will surely prevail at the hearing", Fuenles, at 86 
Defendants' denial of being the direct, legal, proximate, and substantial cause of the mess on 
CCR and their denial that issuing tlie first Wagner driveway access permit was not within the 
scope of their responsibility with the constructive knowledge that they had altered the road and 
that they had not laid out and recorded a "right of way" completely under the auspices of the 
NLCHD attorney is juxtaposed to Plaintiffs right to peacefully enjoy their land. 
"[wlhere a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what 
the govermnent is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." 
Board of Reagents ofstate Colleges, at 574. Plaintiffs have taken no physical actions to protect 
their property interests and have had to continually repair the repeated damages to their fence. 
APPELLATE BRIEF 
Plaintiffs have relied on the prornises o f  one o f  the cornerstones o f  U.S. Constitution, 
unencumbered by the legitimate questions o f  exigent circu~nstances or balances o f  strained 
individual and social rights and have supported their claims at every step with legal authority. 
Nothing in Plaintiffs' actions has been frivolous, even i f  the appellate courts say I.C.5 40-2312 
adjudicates a 50 foot public "right o f  way". The matter has been reduced to a statutory question 
and Plaintiffs maintain a right o f  appeal. See Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc, v. Nash-Holmes, 169 
F.3d 636,645 (9th Cir. 1999) (an action becomes frivolous, for purpose o f  attorney fees award 
under 5 1988, when the result appears obvious or the arguments are wholly without merit). See 
Christiansburg Garment Co, v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,422 (1978) (a defendant can recover 
attorney's fees i f  the plaintiff violates the 5 1988 standard at any point during the litigation, not 
just at its inception). Plaintiffs' loss at the summary judgment stage does not render Plaintiffs' 
case per se frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation for the purpose o f  attorney's fees 
under 5 1988. Id. At a bare min i~nu~n  Plaintiffs have a nominal case under 5 1983. See Carey, at 
266-267. Further the Defendants claims for attorney fees were exorbitant and there was no 
indication that the Highway District had paid the fees the counsel had claimed. To properly 
exercise its discretion on a request for attorney fees, a trial court must, at a minimum, consider the 
twelve factors outlined in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). See Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Jones, 145 
Idaho 106, 195 P.3d 795,798-99 (2007). 
7. The District Court had no subject matter jurisdiction, in the alternative exceeded its 
subject matter jurisdiction, to rule on Defendants' motion for summary judgment and 
vacate the jury trial. Plaintiffs' right to a jury trial is inviolate. See Idaho Const. art I ,  5 7 .  See 
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ACHD, at 179 P.3d 323, 332 (citing I.R.C.P. 38(a)). As the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction may be brought up at any time, Plaintiffs do so now and assert that the District Court 
lacked sub.ject matter jurisdiction to hear Defendants' motion for suinlnary judgment without 
reviewing the agency record for the fulfillment of the legal requirements of the Defendants' 
jurisdictional claims. See Stale ofIdaho v Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372. 374-77, 195 P.3d 731, 
733-36 (Crt. A p p  2008) (defense of subject matter jurisdiction is never waived; judgments in 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction are void; judges are liable for danlages). Parties cannot 
consent to the court's assunlption ofjurisdictio~t hrough conduct or acquiescence nor be 
estopped from asserting its absence. Fairway Developmenl Co, v. Bannock County, 11 9 Idaho 
121, 125, 804 P.2d 294, 298 (1990)). Failure to exhaust agency remedies triggers the District 
Court's subject matter jurisdiction and it appears that the trigger is the importance and lack of 
agency record on which to rule. The matters Plaintiffs sought resolution of are largely, if not 
entirely, niatters of the agency's and the Defendants' specialized activities. See Owsley v. Idaho 
Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 135, 106 P.3d 455, 461 (2005) (the district court does not 
acquire subject matter jurisdictioll until all the administrative remedies have been exhausted). 
See Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721,726, 100 P.3d 615,620 (October, 2004) citing 
Fairway Dev. CO. V .  Bannoclc County, 119 Idaho 121, at 125,804 P.2d 294, at 298 (1990) ("the 
administrative remedy is as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief")). Further, 
I.C.§40-208 restricts the review of the Defendants' jurisdiction to the agency record. The 
District Court has no subject matter jurisdiction on which to rule on a record initially made in the 
District Court and doing so also violates Plaintiffs due process rights as the agency record is the 
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focal point of the Defendants' due process violations. See I d ,  at 725, I00 P.3d 615, at 619 ("the 
focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some 
new record made initially in the reviewing court", citing Canzpt [sic] v. Pitts, 41 1 U.S .  138, 142 
(1973). The issues involved simply confirm the Idaho Supreme Court's concern with the agency 
record, exhaustion of agency remedies, and the Court's subject matter jurisdiction and due 
process concerns. See Idaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. at, 654 8 P.3d 646, 649 (failing 
to confine its decision to record produced at the public hearing violates due process). 
The Idaho Court addressed a similar case in Castrigno v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 106 
P.3d 419, (2005), citing Ware v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 98 Idaho 477, at 483 (1977). Here it 
was not a matter of exhaustion, rather a factual difference. In Ware, as in the present case, the 
plaintiffs sought to deal with the mechanics of the law and the defendants overtly misrepresented 
it rendering exl~austion as a "futile and useless act". Id., at 97, 106 P.3d419, at 423. However 
the factual diffirence exists, the result is the sane here as the implication of subject matter 
jurisdiction is still absent. 
Whether CCR is a "public highway", "established by user", with "a minimum 50 foot 
width mandated by Idaho law" is a matter of the commissioners decisions under Idaho law 
(I.C.§§ 40-13 10,605, and 202), is a matter of exhaustion of agency remedies (I.C.$§ 40-203a 
and 67-8003(3)), or a matter of Plaintiffs' Complaint (property right under 5 1983); all are 
logical subsets of the District Court's subject matter jurisdiction and all circumscribed by the 
subset of the agency record. The subject matter of the Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment lies outside of that circumscription. Defendants' assertion under I.C.§40-23 12 as a 
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request for summary judgment is silnply a veiled attempt to get in effect an "advisory" 
declaratory ruling. The burden of proof of the validity of the legally established public rights in 
CCR as well as the burden of proof that the court has subject matter jurisdiction rests with 
Defendants as well as with the District Court. 
CONCLUSION: Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment must fail. Public rights in 
CCR are limited to the acq~iisition of the users of the road to be established by a jury to a 
standard of the preponderance of the evidence. The authorities in charge of maintenance and 
i~nprovement have unlawfully taken Plaintiffs' land. The limits of Defendants' jurisdiction 
under I.C. $40-202 are well established a id  easily understood by a reasonable person. 
Defendants have no rational basis of a legitimate governmental interest to deny Plaintiffs due 
process andlor equal treatment of the law. Defendants' claim that 1.C.S 40-23 12 adjudicates 
public rights to a 50 foot "right of way" witliout due process of law has no legal merit, or factual 
foundation and is frivolous. The relief sought by Plaintiffs is as follows: (a) to reverse the 
District Court's ruling granting summary judgment to the Defendants; (b) to enjoin the District 
Court from denying Plaintiffs declaratory relief in all matters of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights 
of due process and equal protection of the law (see 5 1983); (c) to grant partial summary 
judgment to Plaintiffs under 42 USC $ 1983 as Defendants are liable for damages in their 
individual and official capacities as to be determined by ajury; (d) to provide Plaintiffs with a 
venue of fair and impartial tribunal if any remand to a lower court is necessary (e) to grant 
Plaintiffs right to amend their complaint with additional damages and additional. allegations of 
abuse of process by Defendants and Defendants' counsel; (f) to enjoin Defendants from 
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e~lforcing their invalid policieslcustoms actionslfailures to act resulting in the improper 
interferences with Plaintiffs' propelty rights and/or an abutting la~idowner's property rights; (g) 
return of all Plaintiffs' land wrongfully taken andlor voiding of all actions resulting in the 
invasions of Plaintiffs' land; (h) to award full common law and/or compensatory damages to be 
determined to Plaintiffs for all damages to Plaintiffs' land and for the time that t.he Defendants 
were in wrongful possession of Plaintiffs' land andlor Plailitiffs were without the peaceful 
enjoyment of their land and without the right to restrict others from their land; and (i) to award 
Plaintiffs any and all attorney fees and costs that have been incurred or shall he incurred in the 
full settlement of this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITED, on this 29''' day of December, 2009 
Don Halvorson, Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 29''' day of December, 2009, I caused 2 true and correct 
copies of this document to be served on RONALD J. LANDECIC, 693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9, 
P.O. Box 9344, Moscow, ID 83843 by hand delivery 
Don Halvorso~i, Pro Se 
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I.C. (i 22-4504.LOCAL ORDINANCES. No city, county, taxing district or other political 
subdivision of this state shall adopt any ordinance or resolution that declares any agricultural 
operation operated in accordance with generally recognized agricultural practices to be a 
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nuisance nor shall any zoning ordinance that forces the closure of any such agricultural operation 
be adopted. Zoning and nuisance ordinances shall not apply to agricultural operations that were 
established outside the corporate limits of a inunicipality and then were incorporated into the 
municipality by annexation. The county planning and zoning authority may adopt a nuisance 
waiver procedure to be recorded with the county recorder or appropriate county recording 
authority pursuant to residential divisions of property. 
I.C.§40-109.DEFINITIONS -- H.(S)"Ilighways" mean roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out 
or established for the public or dedicated or abandoned to the public. Highways shall include 
necessary culverts, sluices, drains, ditches, waterways, embankments, retaining walls, bridges, 
tunnels, grade separation structures, roadside improvements, adjacent lands or interests lawfully 
acquired, pedestrian facilities, and any other structures, works or fixtures incidental to the 
preservation or improvement of the highways. Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order 
of a board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five (5) years, provided 
they shall have been worlted and kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by 
order of a board of commissioners, are highways. 
I.C.§40-117.DEFINlTIONS -- P. (5)"Public highways" means all higl~ways open to public use in 
the state, whether maintained by the state or by any county, highway district, city, or other 
political subdivision. (Also see "Highways," section 40-109, Idaho Code). 
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(6)"Public right-of-way" means a right-of-way open to the public and under the jurisdiction of a 
public highway agency, where the public highway agency has no obligation to construct or 
maintain, but may expend funds for the maintenance of, said public right-wf-way or post traffic 
signs for vehicular traffic on said public right-of-way. In addition, a public right-of-way includes 
a right-of-way which was originally intended for development as a highway and was accepted on 
behalf of the public by deed of purchase, fee simple title, authorized easement, eminent domain, 
by plat, prescriptive use, or abandomnent of a highway pursuant to section 40-203, Idaho Code, 
but shall not include federal land rights-of-way, as provided in section 40-204A, Idaho Code, 
that resulted from the creation of a facility for the transmission of water. Public rights-of-way 
shall not be considered improved highways for the apportionment of funds from the highway 
distribution account. 
I.C.840-202. DESIGNATION OF HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY. (1) The 
initial selectio~l of the county highway system and highway district system may be accomplished 
in the following manner: 
(a) The board of county or highway district commissioners shall cause a map to be prepared 
showing the general location of each highway and public right-of-way in their jurisdiction, and 
the commissioners shall cause notice to be given of intention to adopt the map as the official map 
of that system, and shall specify the time and place at which all interested persons may be heard. 
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(b) After the hearing, the commissioners shall adopt the map, with any changes or revisions 
considered by them to be advisable in the publicinterest, as the official map of the respective 
highway system. 
(2) If a county or highway district acquires an interest in real property for highway or public 
right-of-way purposes, the respective colnrnissioners shall: 
(a) Cause any order or resolution enacted, and deed or other document establishing an interest 
in the property for their highway system purposes to be recorded in the county records; or 
(b) Cause the official map of the county or highway district system to be amended as affected 
by the acceptance of the highway or public right-of-way. 
Provided, however, a county with highway jurisdiction or highway district may hold title to an 
interest in real property for public right-of-way purposes without incurring an obligation to 
construct or maintain a highway within the right-of-way until the county or highway district 
determines that the necessities of public travel justify opening a highway within the right-of-way. 
The lack of an opening shall not constitute an abandonment, and mere use by the public shall not 
constitute an opening of the public right-of-way. 
(3) Highways laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2)of this section, by 
order of a board of commissioners, and all highways used for a period of five (5) years, provided 
they shall have been worked and lcept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by 
order of a board of commissioners, are highways. If a highway created in accordance with the 
provisions of this subsection is not opened as described in subsection (2) ofthis section, there 
shall be no duty to maintain that highway, nor shall there be any liability for any injury or 
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damage for failure to nlaintain it or any highway signs, until the highway is designated as a part 
of the county or highway district system and opened to public travel as a highway. 
(4) When a public right-of-way is created in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) 
of this section, or section 40-203 or 40-203A, Idaho Code, there shall be no duty to maintain that 
public right-of-way, nor shall there be any liability for any injury or damage for failure to 
maintain it or any highway signs. 
(5) Nothing in this section shall limit the power of any board of comlnissioners to 
subsequently include or exclude any highway or public right-of-way from the county or highway 
district system. 
(6) By July 1,2005, and every five (5) years thereafter, the board of county or highway 
district commissioners shall have published in map form and made readily available a map 
showing the general location of all public rights-of-way under its jurisdiction. Any board of 
county or higllway district colnmissioners may be granted an extension of time with approval of 
the legislature by adoption of a concurrent resolution. 
(7) Nothing in this section or in any designation of the general location of a highway or public 
right-of-way shall authorize the public highway agency to assert or claim rights superior to or in 
conflict with any rights-of-way that resulted from the creation of a facility for the transmission of 
water which existed before the designation of the location of a highway or public right-of-way. 
I.C.940-203,ABANDONMENT AND VACATION OF COUNTY AND HIGHWAY 
DISTRICT SYSTEM HIGHWAYS OR PUBLIC RIGI-ITS-OF-WAY. (1) A board of county or 
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highway district commissioners, whichever shall have jurisdiction of the highway system, shall 
use the following procedure to abandon and vacate any highway or public right-of-way in the 
county or highway district system including those which furnish public access to state and 
federal public lands and waters: 
(a) The commissioners may by resolution declare its intention to abandon and vacate any 
highway or public right-of-way considered no longer to be in the public interest. 
(b) Any resident, or property holder, within a county or highway district system including the 
state of Idaho, any of its subdivisions, or my agency of the federal government may petition the 
respective commissioners for abandonment and vacation of any highway or public right-of-way 
within their highway system. The petitioner shall pay a reasonable fee as determined by the 
commissioners to cover the cost of the proceedings. 
(c) The commissioners shall establish a hearing date or dates on the proposed abandonment and 
vacation. 
(d) The commissioners shall prepare a public notice stating their intention to hold a public 
hearing to consider the proposed abandonment and vacation of a highway or public right-of-way 
which shall be made available to the public not later than thirty (30) days prior to any hearing 
and mailed to any person requesting a copy not more than three (3) working days after any such 
request. 
(e) At least thirty (30) days prior to any hearing scheduled by the commissioners to consider 
abandonment and vacation of any highway or public right-of-way, the commissioners shall mail 
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notice by United States mail to lwown owners and operators of an underground facility, as 
defined it1 section 55-2202, Idaho Code, that lies within the highway or public right-of-way. 
(r) At least thirty (30) days prior to any hearing scheduled by the comlnissioners to consider 
abandonment and vacation of any highway or public right-of-way, the commissioners shall Inail 
notice to owners of record of land abutting the portion of the highway or public right-of-way 
proposed to be abandoned and vacated at their addresses as shown on the county assessor's tax 
rolls and shall publish notice of the hearing at least two (2) times if in a weeltly newspaper or 
three (3) times if in a daily newspaper, the last notice to be published at least five (5) days and 
not more than twenty-one (21) days before the hearing. 
(g) At the hearing, the comlnissioners shall accept all information relating to the proceedings. 
Any person, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or any agency of the federal 
government, may appear and give testimony for or against abandonment. 
(h) After completion of the proceedings and consideration of all related information, the 
commissioners shall decide whether the abandonment and vacation of the highway or public 
right-of-way is in the public interest of the highway jurisdiction affected by the abando~unent or 
vacation. The decision whether or not to abandon and vacate the highway or public right-of-way 
shall be written and shall be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(i) If the commissioners determine that a highway or public right-of-way parcel to be abandoned 
and vacated in accordance with the provisions of this section has a fair market value of twenty- 
five hundred dollars ($2,500) or more, a charge may be imposed upon the acquiring entity, not in 
excess of the fair market value of the parcel, as a condition of the abandonment and vacation; 
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provided, however, no such charge shall be imposed on the landowner who originally dedicated 
such parcel to the public for use as a highway or public right-of-way; and provided further, that if 
the highway or public right-of-way was originally a federal land right-of-way, said highway or 
public right-of-way shall revert to a federal land right-of-way. 
6) The colnlnissioners shall cause any order or resolution to be recorded in the county records 
and the official map of the highway system to be amended as affected by the abandonment and 
vacation. 
(k) From any such decision, a resident or property holder within the county or highway district 
system, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions or any agency of the federal 
government, may appeal to the district court of the county in which the highway or public right- 
of-way is located pursuant to section 40-208, Idaho Code. 
(2) No highway or public right-of-way or parts thereof shall be abandoned and vacated so 
as to leave any real property adjoining the highway or public right-of-way without access to an 
established highway or public right-of-way. 
(3) In the event of abandonment and vacation, rights-of-way or easenlents may be 
reserved for the continued use of existing sewer, gas, water, or similar pipelines and 
appurtenances, or other underground facilities as defined in section 55-2202, Idaho Code, for 
ditches or canals and appurtenances, and for electric, telephone and similar lines and 
appurtenances. 
(4) A highway abandoned aud vacated under the provisions of this section may he 
reclassified as a public right-of-way. 
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(5) Until abandonment is authorized by the comn~issioners, public use of the highway or 
public right-of-way may not be restricted or impeded by encroachnent or ir~stallation of any 
obstruction restricting public use, or by the installatioi~ of signs or notices that might tend to 
restrict or prohibit public use. Any person violating the provisions of this subsection shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
( 6 )  When a county or highway district desires the abandonment or vacation of any 
highway, public street or public right-of-way which was accepted as part of a platted subdivision 
said abandonment or vacation shall be accomplished pursuant to the provisions of chapter 13, 
title 50, Idaho Code. 
I.C.940-203a.VALIDATION OF COUNTY OR HIGHWAY DISTRICT SYSTEM I-IIGHWAY 
OR PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY.([) Any resident or property holder within a county or highway 
district system, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or any agency of the 
federal government, may petition the board of county or highway district commissioners, 
whichever shall have jurisdiction of the highway system, to initiate public proceedings to 
validate a highway or public right-of-way, including those which furnish public access to state 
and federal public lands and waters, provided that the petitioner shall pay a reasonable fee as 
determined by the cominissioners to cover the cost of the proceedings, or the com~nissioners may 
initiate validation proceedings on their own resolution, if any of the following conditions exist: 
(a) If, through omission or defect, doubt exists as to the legal establishment or evidence of 
establishment of a highway or public right-of-way; 
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(b) If the location of the highway or public right-of-way cannot be accurately determined due to 
numerous alterations of the highway or public right-of-way, a defective survey of the highway, 
public right-of-way or adjacent property, or loss or destruction of the original survey of the 
highways or public rights-of-way; or 
(c) If the highway or public right-of-way as traveled and used does not generally conform to the 
location of a highway or public right-of-way described on the official highway system map or in 
the public records. 
(2) If proceedings for validation of a highway or public right-of-way are initiated, the 
commissiollers shall follow the procedure set forth in sectio1140-203, Idaho Code, and shall: 
(a) If the con~missioners determine it is necessary, cause the highway or public right-of-way to 
be surveyed; 
(b) Cause a report to be prepared, inciuding consideration of any survey a~ld  any other 
information required by the commissioners; 
(c) Establish a hearing date on the proceedings for validation; 
(d) Cause notice of the proceedings to be provided in the same manner as for abandonment and 
vacation proceedings; and 
(e) At the hearing, the commissioners shall consider all information relating to the proceedings 
and shall accept testimony from persons having an interest in the proposed validation. 
(3) Upon completion of the proceedings, the coln~nissioners shall determicle whether 
validation of the highway or public right-of-way is in the public interest and shall enter an order 
1 validating the highway or public right-of-way as public or declaring it not to be public. 
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(4) From any such decision, any resident or properly holder within a county or highway 
district system, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or any agency of the 
federal government, may appeal to the district court of the county in which the highway or public 
right-of-way is located pursuant to section 40-208, Idaho Code. 
(5) When a board of commissioners validates a highway or public right-of-way, it shall 
cause the order validating the highway or public right-of-way, and if surveyed, cause the survey 
to be recorded in the county records and shall amend the official highway system map of the 
respective county or highway district. 
(6) The commissioners shall proceed to determine and provide just conlpensation for the 
removal of any structure that, prior lo creation of the highway or public right-of-way, encroached 
upon a highway or public right-of-way that is the subject of a validation proceeding, or if such is 
not practical, the colnmissioners niay acquire property to alter the highway or public riglit-of- 
way being validated. 
(7) This section does not apply to the validation of any highway, public street or public 
right-of-way which is to be accepted as part of a platted subdivision pursuant to chapter 13, title 
50, Idaho Code. 
I.C.540-208.JUDICIAL REVIEW (1) Any resident or property holder within the county or 
highway district system, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or any agency of 
the federal government, who is aggrieved by a final decision of a board of county or highway 
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district conlmissioners ill an abandonment and vacation or validation proceeding is entitled to 
judicial review under the provisions of this section. 
(2) Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition in the district court of the county in 
which the commissioners have jurisdiction over the highway or public right of way within 
twenty-eight (28) days after the filing of the final decision of the commissioners or, if a rehearing 
is requested, within twenty-eight (28) days after the decision thereon. 
(3) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the commissioners' decision. The 
reviewing court may order a stay upon appropriate terms. 
(4) Within thirty (30) days after the service of the petition, or within further time allowed by the 
court, the commissioners shall transmit to the reviewing court the original, or a certified copy, of 
the entire record of the proceeding under review. By stipulation of all parties to the review 
proceedings, the record may be shortened. A party unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the 
record may be ordered by the court to pay for additional costs. The court may require subsequent 
corrections to the record and may also require or permit additions to the record. 
(5) If, before the date set for hearing, application is made to the court for leave to present 
additional information, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional 
information is material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding 
before the conimissioners, the court may order that the additional information shall be presented 
to the commissioners upon conditions deterlnined by the court. The commissioners may modify 
their findings and decisions by reason of the additional information and shall file that 
information and any modifications, new findings, or decisions with the reviewing court. 
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(6 )  The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record. 
In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the comn~issio~lers, not shown in the record, 
proof thereon may be taken in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and 
receive written briefs. 
(7) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the conln~issioners as to the weight of 
the information on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the co~nmissioners or 
remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if 
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the cominissioners' findings, 
inferences, coiiclusions or decisions are: 
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners; 
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) Affected by other error of law; 
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial information on the whole 
record; or 
(0 Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise 
of discretion. 
I.C.340-604 DUTIES AND POWERS OF COMMISSIONERS. Commissioners shall: 
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(1) Exercise general supervisioll over all highways in the county highway system, including 
their location, design, construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance, and develop general 
policies regarding highway matters. 
(2) Cause to be surveyed, viewed, laid out, recorded, opened and worked, any highways or 
public rights-of-way as are necessary for public convenience under the provisions of sections 40- 
202 and 40-203A, Idaho Code. 
(3) Cause to be recorded all highways and public rights-of-way within their highway 
system.. . 
(7) Contract, purchase, or otherwise acquire the right-of-way over private property for the use 
of county highways and for this purpose may institute proceedings under the code of civil 
procedure.. . 
[(13)](14) By July 1,2000, and every five (5) years thereafter, the co~n~nissioners shall have 
published in map form and made readily available the location of all public rights-of-way under 
their jurisdiction. The commissioners of a district may be granted an extension of time with 
approval of the legislature by adoption of a concurrent resolution. 
I.C.§40-605 LAYING OUT OF NEW EIIGHWAYS-WIDENING, CHANGING, OR 
STRAIGHTENING EXISTING HIGHWAYS-PURCHASE OF RIGHTS-OF-WAY BY 
AGFGEMENT. Coinmissioners niay lay out new highways within the county as they deterinine 
to be necessary. The right-of-way of any highway shall not be less than fifty (50) feet wide, 
except in exceptional cases. Co~nmissioners may also change the width or location or straighten 
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lines of any highway under their jurisdiction. If, in the laying out, widening, changing or 
straightening of any highway it shall becocne necessary to take private property, the 
cornn~issioners or their director of highways shall cause a survey of the proposed highway to be 
made, together with an accurate description of the lands required. The commissioners shall 
endeavor to agree with each owner for the purchase of a right-of-way over his land included 
within the description. If they are able to agree with the owner, the com~nissioners may purchase 
the land out of the county highway fund under their control, and the land shall then be conveyed 
to the county for the use and purpose of highways. 
I.C.340-608 RECORD OF HIGHWAY PROCEEDINGS. The clerk of the co~n~nissioners 
shall keep a book in which must be recorded separately all proceedings of the commissioners 
relative to each highway division, including orders laying out, altering, and opening highways; 
and in a separate book a description of each highway division, its deputy directors of highways, 
its highways, contracts, and all other lnatters pertaining to them. 
I.C. 3 40-1310. POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIGI-IWAY DISTRICT COMMISSIONERS. (1) 
The commissioners of a highway district have exclusive general supervision and jurisdiction 
over all highways and public rights-of-way within their highway system, with full power to 
construct, maintain, repair, acquire, purchase and improve all highways within their highway 
system, whether directly or by their own agents and employees or by contract. Except as 
otherwise provided in this chapter in respect to the highways within their highway system, a 
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highway district shall have all of the powers and duties that would by law be vested in the 
commissioners of the county and in the district directors of highways if the highway district had 
not been organized. Where any highway within the limits of the highway district has been 
designated as a state highway, then the board shall have exclusive supervision, jurisdiction and 
control over the designation, location, maintenance, repair and reconstruction of it. The highway 
district shall have power to manage and conduct the business and affairs of the district; establish 
and post speed and other regulatory signs; make and execute all necessary contracts; have an 
office and employ and appoint agents, attorneys, officers and employees as may be required, and 
prescribe their duties and fix their compensation. Highway district commissioners and their 
agents and employees have the right to enter upon any lands to make a survey, and may locate 
the necessary works on the line of any highways on any land which may be deemed best for the 
location. 
(2) The highway district shall also have the right to acquire either by purchase, or other legal. 
means, all lands and other property necessary for the construction, use, maintenance, repair and 
improvement of highways in their system. The highway district may change the width or 
location, or straighten lines of any highway in their system, and if in the constructing, laying out, 
widening, changing, or straightening of any highways, it shall become necessary to take private 
property, the district director of highways, with the consent and on order of the highway district 
commissioners, shall cause a survey of the proposed highway to be made, together with an 
accurate description of the lands required. He shall endeavor to agree with each owner of 
properly for the purchase of a right-of-way over the lands included within the description. If the 
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director is able to agree with the owner of the lands, the highway district co~n~nissioners may 
purchase the land and pay for it out of the funds of the highway district, and the lands purchased 
shall the11 be conveyed to the highway district for the use and purpose of highways. 
(3) Whenever the director of highways shall be unable to agree with any person for the purchase 
of laud, or that person shall be unltnown or a nonresident of the county in which the highway 
district is situated, or a minor, or an insane or incompetent person, the director shall have the 
right, subject to the order of the highway district commissio~lers, to begin action in the name of 
the highway district in the district court of the county in which the district is situated, to conde~nn 
the land necessary for the right-of-way for the highway, under the provisions of chapter 7, title 7, 
Idaho Code. An order of the highway district commissioners entered upon its minutes that the 
land sought to be condemned is necessary for a public highway and public use shall be prima 
facie evidence of the fact. 
I.C.§40-2302 PUBLIC ACQUIRES FEE SIMPLE TITLE-RECORD AND DEDICATION OF 
I-IIGHWAYS. (1) By taking or accepting land for a highway, the public acquires the fee simple 
title to the property. The person or persons having jurisdiction of the highway may take or accept 
lesser estate as they may deem requisite for their purposes. 
(2) In all cases where consent to use the right-of-way for a highway is volu~itarily given, 
purchased, or condemned and paid for, either an instrument in writing conveying the right-of- 
way and incidents to it, signed and acknowledged by the party making it, or a certified copy of 
the decree of the court condemning it, must be made, filed and recorded in the office of the 
recorder of the county in which the land conveyed or condemned shall be particularly described. 
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(3) No highway dedicated by the owner to the public shall be deemed a public highway, 
or bc under the use or control of a county or highway district unless the dedication shall be 
accepted and confirn~ed by the commissioners of tlic county or highway district. 
I.C.$40-2312.WIDTH OF HIGHWAYS. All highways, except bridges and those located within 
cities, shall be not iess than fifty (50) feet wide, except those of a lesser width presently existing, 
and may be as wide as required for proper construction and maintenance in the discretion of the 
authority in charge of the construction and maintenance. Bridges located outside incorporated 
cities shall be the same width to and across the river, creek or stream as the highway leading to 
it. 
I.C.$40-2316. PRIVATE HIGHWAYS-ESTABLISHMENT. Private highways may be opened 
for the convenience of one or more residents of any county highway system or highway district 
in the same manner as public highways are opened, whenever the appropriate comn~issioners 
may order the highway to be opened. The person for whose benefit the highway is required shall 
pay any damages awarded to landowners, and lteep the private highway in repair. 
I.C.$40-2317.REMOVAL OF FENCES. When the alteration of an old or the opening of a new 
highway lnaltes it necessary to remove fences on land given, purchased or condemned by order 
of a court for highway purposes, notice to remove the fences shall be given by the director of 
highways to the owner, his occupant, or agent, or by posting the notice on the fence. If removal 
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is not accomplished within ten (10) days, or colnmenced and prosecuted as speedily as possible, 
the director of highways may cause it to be carefully removed at the expense of the owner, and 
recover from him the cost of removal. The fence material may be sold to satisfy the judgment. 
I.C.540-2319.ENCROACI-IMENTS-REMOVAL-NOTTCNALTY FOR FAILURE TO 
REMOVE-REMOVAL BY COUNTY OR HIGHWAY DISTRICT-ABATEMENT. (1) If 
any highway or public right-of-way under tlie jurisdictioii of a county or highway district is 
encroached upon by gates, fences, buildings, or otherwise, the appropriate county or highway 
district may require the encroachment to be removed. If the encroachmellt is of a nature as to 
effectually obstruct and prevent the use of the highway or public right-of-way for vehicles, the 
coulity or highway district shall immediately cause the e~icroachment o be removed. 
- (2) Notice sliall be given to the occupant or owner of the land, or person causing or 
owning the encroachment, or left at his place of residence if he resides in tlie highway 
jurisdiction. If not, it shall be posted 01.1 the encroachment, specifying the place and extent of the 
encroachment, and requiring hiin to remove the encroachmelit within ten (10) days. 
(3) If the encroachnent is not removed, or co~nmenced to be removed, prior to the 
expiration of ten (10) days from tlie service or posting the notice, the person who caused, owns 
or controls the encroachment shall forfeit up to one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for each day the 
encroachment continues unremoved. 
(4) If the encroachment is denied, and the owner, occupant, or person controlli~lg the 
encroachment, refuses either to remove it or to permit its removal, the county or highway district 
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shall commence in the proper court an action to abate the encroachment as a nuisance. If the 
county or highway district recovers judgment, it may, in addition to having the encroachment 
abated, recover up to one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for every day the nuisance remained after 
notice, as well as costs of the legal action and removal. 
(5) If the encroachment is not denied, but is not removed within five (5) days after the 
notice is complete, the county or highway district may remove it at the expense of the owner, 
occupant, or person controlling the encroachment, and the county or highway district may 
recover costs and expenses, as well as the sun1 of up to one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for each 
day the encroachment remained after notice was complete. 
I.C.367-8003 PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY. (2)Upon the written request of an 
owner of real property that is the subject of such action, such request being filed with the clerk or 
the agency or entity undertaking the regulatory or administrative action not more than twenty- 
eight (28) days after the final decision concerning the matter at issue, a state agency or local 
governmental entity shall prepare a written taking analysis concerning the action. Any regulatory 
taking analysis prepared hereto shall comply with the process set forth in this chapter, including 
use of the checklist developed by the attorney general pursuant to subsection ( I )  of this section 
and shall be provided to the real property owner no longer than forty-two (42) days after the date 
of filing the request with the clerk or secretary of the agency whose action is questioned. A 
regulatory taking analysis prepared pursuant to this section shall he considered public 
information. 
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(3) A governmental action is voidable if a written talting analysis is not prepared after a request 
has been made pursuant to this chapter. A private real property owner, whose property is the 
subject of governmental action, affected by a governmental action without the preparation of a 
requested taking analysis as required by this section may seek judicial determination of the 
validity of the gover~lmental action by initiating a declaratory judglnent action or other 
appropriate legal procedure. A snit seelting to invalidate a governmental action for 
~ l o ~ ~ c o ~ n p l i a l ~ c e  with subsection (2) of this section must be filed in a district court in the county in 
which the private property owner's affected real property is located. If the affected property is 
located in more than one (I)  county, the private property owner may file suit in any county in 
which the affected real propelty is located. 
(4) During the preparation of the taking analysis, any time li~nitatio~l relevant to the regulatory or 
administrative actions shall be tolled. Such tolling shall cease when the talting analysis has been 
provided to the property owner. Both the request for a taking analysis and the taking analysis 
shall be part of the official record regarding the regulatory or administrative action. 
42 U.S.C. 9 1983: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or iru~llunities ecured by the Constitution and laws, shall bc 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in 
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such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree 
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.. . 
U. S. Constitution Amend. V. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be talcen for 
public use, without just compensation. 
U. S. Constitution Amend. XIV 9 1. Section 1. AIL persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jr~risdictioii thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce ally law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, witliont 
due process of law; nor deny to any person withirr its jurisdiction the equal protectioil of the laws. 
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